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IN THE SUPR.EME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
N.J. MEAGHER, Jr., MARY ALICE
ARENTZ, KATHERINE C. IVERS,
MARGARET FRANCES PRICE, N. J.
MEAGHER and KATHERINE T.
MEAGHER, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
(Appellants and Respondents)

-vs.vVEBER OIL COMPANY, JOE T.
JUHAN and PAUL STOC.K,

Case No.
8483

Defendants,
(Appellants and Respondents)
and

EQUITY OIL C01fP ANY and ALL
UNKNOWN PERSONS who claim any
interest in the subject matter of this
Defendants.
action,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT
WEBER OIL COMPANY
Plaintiffs' opening brief deviates so substantially
from the prescribed rule and contains so many half truths
that we are required, as .an aid to the Court, to make a
comprehensive statement of the record rather than to pinpoint the contradictions.
Plaintiffs, in their brief, seen1 to ignore the proposi-
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tion that this is an appeal from a summary judgment with
a record devoid of any finding of bad faith, conspiracy,
fraud, breach of fiduciary relationship, damages or interest. The primary question is whether the combined
25% of the oil heretofore awarded to defendants Stock
and Juhan is to be taken from the Stock half or the
Phebus half of the Sheridan Lease. Weber Oil Company
admittedly O"\Vns the Phebus half. The Stock half has
heretofore, after mandate, been litigated (Meagher v.
Uintah Gas Co. et al., 255 P. 2d 989). It was by the affirmed decree in that case that Stock and Juhan were
awarded a combined 25% of the lessee's rights with respect to oil under the lease.
While this is the first time that the corporate defendants have been named as parties in this litigation,
factual statements are made in the two previous decisions
of this Court (185 P. 2d 747 and 255 P. 2d 989), ''hich
facts, we assume, need not be reiterated except as may
be dee1ned .advisable by way of emphasis.

STATE!fENT OF THE CASE
Appellants' coinplaint (R. 1-1~), consisting of four
counts, 'vas filed on !fay 11, 195-!. The Fourth Count (R.
9-10) claims damage by reason of possible accumulations
of inco1ne tax not yet paid by plaintiffs but which they
say they '""ill have to pay in higher incon1e tax brackets
in the year they receive the proceeds fron1 oil runs providing they .are entitled to such proceeds. This count ''as
disposed of by the trial court in a for1nal order of disInissal dated December 21, 1954 (R. 113-114). No apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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peal is taken from the order of dismissal except that
plaintiffs in paragraph 3 of their statement of points
''in re appeal" of Weber Oil Company (R. 346-347) and
their statement of points "in re the appeals of" defendants Stock and Juhan (R. 368-369) refer to the ruling and
designate the count as a "trespass to personal property."
In the Rulings on Motions signed, dated and filed by
the trial court on the 14th day of October, 1955 (R. 213215) it is ruled that "The Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted as to the first and third
counts of the Plaintiffs' Complaint." The First Count
(R. 1-4) is to quiet title and to cancel and remove of record certain specific documents to the extent that the s.ame
may be a cloud upon plaintiffs' title. The Third Count
(R. 8) alleges that defendants have converted to their
own use the plaintiffs' share of the oil and the proceeds
thereof produced by defendants from the lands covered
by the Sheridan Lease. There is no appeal or cross .appeal taken from the ruling dated October 14, 1955.
The Second Count (R. 4-8) alleges that plaintiffs are,
and since January 27, 1948 have been, the owners in equal
shares of the leasehold estate consisting of an undivided
one-half interest in the lessee's rights with respect to oil
under the so-called Sheridan Lease, and is one for an accounting joined with allegations calculated to support
the order to show cause and the temporary restraining
order 'vhich vvas issued on the date the complaint was
filed (R. 14-19). The restraining order was vacated and
set aside and plaintiffs' motion for a temporary injunc-
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tion was denied and the order to show cause dismissed
by the formal order of the court dated September 23, 1954
(R. 123-12'5) after a he.aring at Vernal, Utah, on l\{ay
20, 1954, which hearing was stenographically reported.
The transcript is in the record in this case.
At the hearing on the order to sho'v cause the court,
as the order of September 23, 1954 states, considered the
affidavit of N. J. Meagher, Jr. (R. 20-30), the counter
affidavit of Weber Oil Company by J. L. Doug.an, its
President (R. 57-65), the counter affidavit of Equity Oil
Company by J. L. Dougan, its President and General
~fanager (R. 66-67), and the affidavit of Paul Stock and
Joe T. Juhan (R. 68-71), and concluded that the plaintiffs
had failed to establish that there was any threat that
the defendants would remove their property from the
jurisdiction of the court and that plaintiffs had failed to
establish .any grounds 'vhatsoever for injunctive relief.
In the order of September 23, 1954, by paragraph
4 thereof, defendant Equity Oil Company was required
"pursuant to the stipulation of the parties n1ade in open
court" to continue "to hold in a special fund an amount
equal to 40.75 per cent of the gross c.rude oil runs from the
property described in plaintiffs' complaint after deducting operating expenses, until the further order of the
Court." And in the san1e order the Senior !Ieaghers
(N.J. Meagher and !Catherine T. l\Ieagher, his "'ife) 'vere
included as parties plaintiff, it being ordered that "they
shall be dee1ned to have adopted the allegations of said
complaint 'vithout further an1endinent thereof." (R. 123125).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The 40.75% of the gross crude oil runs from the
property is the amount allocated to one-half of the working interest in the Sheridan Lease after giving effect to
outstanding royalties totaling 18¥2%. The impounding
w.as with the knowledge, acquiescence and approval of
\Veber Oil Company, the defendants Stock and Juhan,
the plaintiff N. J. ~1eagher, Sr. and a written commitment made by Equity Oil Company under date of August
31, 1950 (R. 63).
The court in its rulings on motions dated October
14, 1955 (R. 213-215 at page 214) concludes that Equity
Oil Company appears only as .a "stakeholder"; that
Equity has, pursuant to an agreement with the plaintiffs,
maintained a special account of an amount equal to at
least 40.75% of the gross crude oil runs .after expenses
of operations; that plaintiffs are entitled to a summary
judgment against the defendant Equity Oil Company on
the Second Count of plaintiffs' complaint; for an accounting of the operations and profits of the oil produced by
said defendant on the lands in question; and to a judgment against defendant Equity Oil Company for an
amo~ equal to one-half of the proceeds after operating
expenses are deducted.
The Interlocutory Judgment and Decree, as prepared
by plaintiffs' counsel, was entered on December 13, 1955
(R. 216-224). On the same day the court entered its order
in favor of Juhan and Stock (R. 245) ordering Equity
Oil Company to forthwith pay over to them jointly or to
their order one-half of the 40.75% of the proceeds of the
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gross crude oil runs then in its hands as stakeholder after
deducting the appropriate share of operating expenditures. This order conflicts with the plaintiffs' Interlocutory Judgment and Decree which requires Equity Oil
Company to pay over to the plaintiffs (excluding the
Senior Meaghers) the entire 40.75% "less one-half of
said expenses." All parties, including the plaintiffs but
excluding Equity Oil Company, purport to appeal from
the Interlocutory Judgment and Decree or parts thereof
(R. 306, 310, 314, 346-347, 348-349, 368-369). The plaintiffs appeal from the order of December 13, 1955, directing Equity Oil Company to pay over to defendants Stock
and Juhan jointly or to their order one-half of the 40.75%
of the proceeds of gross crude oil runs held by it as
stakeholder after deducting the appropriate proportionate share of operating expenditures (R. 319).
By an order dated December 15, 1955 and filed December 17, 1955 (R. 246) the court purported to recall, vacate
and set aside its said order dated December 13, 1955, in
favor of Juhan and Stock. The order of December 15,
1955, is made the subject of appeal by defendants Stock
and Juhan (R. 310).

Specific objections to the forn1 of Interlocutory J udgInent and Derree as proposed by plaintiffs 'vere made by
defendant Weber Oil Con1pany (R. 235-241). Defendants
Stock and Juhan filed their objections to the proposed
Interlocutory Judgn1ent and Decree and made their
motion for an order requiring Equity Oil Con1p.any to
forthwith pay over to them jointly one-half of the 40.75%
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of the gross crude oil runs after deducting the proportionate share of operating expenditures, basing the motion upon the affirmed and final Dunford decree in Civil
Case 2238 in the same court, and expressly stated that
the motion should not be construed as an admission on
the p.art of those defendants that plaintiffs are entitled
to the other one-half of said 40.75% (R. 230-234).
Civil Case 2238, Uintah County, Utah, is the same
case taken to this Court in Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co.
et al., 255 P. 2d 989. The Dunford decree referred to is
the Judgment and Decree dated June 4, 1951, a certified
copy of which, together with the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law .are found at pages 281-305 of the
record herein. The Dunford decree is the subject of
the remittitur from this Court dated February 11, 1953,
and introduced as evidence in the instant case as Exhibit
5, which remittitur reads in part as follows:
"This cause having been heretofore argued
and submitted and the Court being sufficiently
advised in the premises, it is now ordered, .ad. judged and decreed that the judgment of the lower
court be, and the same is modified in accordance
with the views expressed in the opinion filed herein, and as so modified the judgment is affirmed,
each party to bear its own costs on appeal.
ISSUED January 20, 1954"
In the instant case, .after the filing of the answer
and counterclaim of defendant Weber Oil Company (R.
80-90), the answer of defendant Equity Oil Company
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(I{. 91-95), the answer and counterclaim of defendant
Juhan (R. 96-100), the answer and counterclaim of defendant Stock (R. 101-112), the reply of plaintiffs to the
counterclaim contained in the answer of defendants Stock
and Juhan (R. 149-154) and the reply of plaintiffs to the
respective pleadings filed by Weber Oil Company and
Equity Oil Company (R. 155-160), the plaintiffs filed
their motions for summary judgn1ent (R.162-163), basing
their motions upon the records and files "of this court"
and the affidavit of N. J. ~Ieagher in support thereof,
portions of which affidavit (R. 165-186) the corporate
defendants moved to strike (R. 190-202) as did the defendants Stock and Juhan (R. 203-206).
Weber Oil Company made its motion for summary
judgment (R. 188-189) basing the same upon the records
and files "in the within action, including the depositions
and admissions of the plaintiffs herein and upon the decision" of this Court in its Case 7723 (llfeagher v. Uintah
Gas Co. et al., 255 P. 2d 989) and the remittitur issued
from this Court in said case January 20, 1954. The corporate defendants, by J. L. Dougan, filed their affidavit
on motion for sun1mary judgment (R. 207-212).
The trial court, in its rulings of October 1-±, 1955
(R. 213-215), erroneously stated that defendants Juhan,
Stock and Equity Oil Company had filed motions for
sunnnary judgn1ent as well as the plaintiffs. The fact is
that the plaintiffs and the defendant \\T eber Oil Company
were the only ones to file n1otions for sun1n1ary judgment
prior to the date of October 14, 1955. The court in its
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rulings (R. 213) considered it unnecessary to rule on the
motions to strike portions of the affidavit of N. J.
Meagher made in support of plaintiffs' motion for a
su1nmary judgment.
The hearing had at Provo, Utah, on the motions for
summary judgment on May 25, 26 and 27, 1955, was
stenographically reported and the transcript of the hearing is a part of this record. The deposition of N.J. Meagher, taken in the instant case, was read into the record
(Rep. Tr. 48-166). Among the exhibits was a quitclaim
deed (P-7) dated ~iay 10, 1954, the day before this action
was filed, whereby N. J. Meagher and Katherine T. Me.agher, his wife, quitclaimed to the other plaintiffs, their
children, the property described in the complaint, also
P-13, an agreement dated April 9, 1951, between Equity
Oil Company, Weber Oil Company, Joe T. Juhan and
Paul Stock, recorded March 11, 1953. The entire record
in Civil Case 2238 w.as received by the court in the hearing on the motions as well as the remittitur from this
Court in its Case 7723.
STAT.EMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1.
WEBER OIL COMPANY SHOULD BE DISMISSED OUT
OF THE ACTION WITH A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ITS
FAVOR AS TO THE TI'TLE THAT IT ADMIT·TEDLY OWNS.
POINT 2.
THE IN·TERLO,CUTORY JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF
DECEMBER 13, 1955, IS VOID AS T·O WEBER OIL COMPANY.
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POINT 3.
THIS COUR'T CAN ONLY ACT HEREIN AS AN APPELLATE COURT AND NOT AS A COURT HAVING ORIGINAL
JURISDitCTION.
POINT 4.
THE INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND DECREE
WAS AN IMPOSITION UP'ON THE TRIAL COURT.
POINT 5.
THE FOURTH COUNT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AS
AGAINST ANY OF THE DEFENDANTS.

ARGU1fENT
Appendices A, B, C, H, I, J, K, M and Nat the end
of plaintiffs' .brief all refer to matters adjudicated in
Civil Case 2238 and finally disposed of b-y this Court on
appeal in Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co. et al., 255 P. 2d 989.
The question immediately arises as to how many times
matters can be litigated and when have the plaintiffs exhausted their cause of action. The tenor of plaintiffs'
brief 'vould be to accept in part and to reject in part that
which has been previously litigated. The various indicia
of ownership, if any, and the testimony of the witnesses
loses its identity and has become merged in the judgment
by all of the authorities. The plaintiffs in the instant case,
by clever subtlety, are atte1npting (1) to avoid the consequences of their failure to appeal or cross appeal in
the previous case fron1 the deeree a'Yarding Stock onesixteenth and Juhan three-sixteenths of the oil produced
under the Sheridan Lease (~~ of the 40.75%); and (2}
to avoid their omission to join in a petition for rehearing
in the last appeal (Case 7723). To obscure these fundaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mental omissions they indulge in name calling beneath
the dignity of reply, and in so doing hope to divert attention from the real issues involved.
POINT 1.
WEBER OIL COMPANY SHOULD BE DISMISSED OUT
OF THE ACTION WITH A SUMMAR.Y JUDGMENT IN ITS
FAVOR AS TO THE TITLE THAT IT ADMITTEDLY OWNS.

The .affidavit of N. J. Meagher, Jr. herein (R. 2728) referring to Civil Case 22'38, the former action, states:
"The trial court, on March 6, 1951, adjudicated that Meagher, for the use and benefit of his
grantees, the plaintiffs herein, w.as, as against
defendants Juhan and Stock, the owner of the half
interest in the lease to which he asserted title.
Neither defendant Equity Oil Company nor defendant Weber Oil Company were parties to that
litigation for, as hereinabove recited, issues had
been joined thereon long before either of said p.arties acquired any interest whatsoever in the Sheridan Lease, and for the further reason that the
only interest or title held by said defendants is
derivative froJn and traceable to the Phebus onehalf interest, which one-half interest is not in
dispute." (Emphasis added.)
The second sentence of the .above quote is a direct
admission that the Phebus half of the Sheridan Lease
is not in litigation and never has been and that plaintiffs
make no claim to the same. The first sentence of the
quote refers to the ~Iemorandum Decision of March 6,
1951, found at pages 140-194 of the record on appe.al in
Case 2238 and not to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
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of Law and Decree entered in that case on June 4, 1951
(R. 281-305). The decree awards to Stock and Juhan a
combined 25% of the oil. It is untrue to say, as does the
first sentence of the above quote, that on March 6, 1951,
it was adjudicated that !ieagher was, as against defendants Juhan and Stock, the owner of the half interest in
the lease to which he asserted title.
It is interesting to note, however, that in the Memorandum Decision, at page 167 of former record on appeal,
Judge Dunford rationalizes the mandate of this Court
in the first appeal as follows :
"By directing further proceedings, instead of
merely ordering judgment for the defendants, or
judgment quieting plaintiff's title subject to the
lease, it appeared to this Court that the only possible thing contentplated by the Supreme Court
was to deternz,ine the parties' rights under the
lease. The plaintiff was compelled to accept that
interpretation, and moved to have his rights, as
well as the rights of the defendants thereunder,
determined. The n1ost that could be said of his
change of position is that he "\Yas 1nistaken in his
understanding that Al and A5 (the Sheridan
Lease and !Iodification Agreement) were void
and constituted nothing n1ore than a cloud upon
his property." (En1phasis added.)
The theory announced by the trial judge (Dunford)
was carried in to the Findings of Fact~ Conclusions of
La'v and Decree of June 4, 1951, "\Yhere the court proceeded to delineate the whole title to the leasehold. This
Court on appeal, 255 P. 2d 989 at p.age 992, contrary to
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the theory that a new cause of action was before the trial
court, said :

"* * * that .an entirely new and different cause
may not be pleaded by reply. Nor could a plaintiff
in a quiet title action assert title acquired after
its commencement. * * * We cannot view Meagher's claim of one-half interest alleged in his
amended reply as a new or different cause. After
revers.al by this court, he conceded only half ownership in the originally pleaded whole. Meagher's
action persists on the same theory, - one to quiet
title."
This Court states:
"J\1eagher claims nothing through Phebus, but
claims a one-half interest through Stock's 'release,'
:Ill
*"
l)(l

And that one of the three claims brought into the case
since the former decision (185 P. 2d 747) was :
"Stock's, by counterclaim, to assert a one-half
interest in operating rights in 440 acres, in opposition to Meagher's identical claim."
In the previous decision, 185 P. 2d 747 at page 748, it is
stated:
"On January 19, 1945, Phebus quitclaimed his
interest to Juhan."
This Court in 255 P. 2d 989, at p.age 991, finds that:
"Defendant Juhan has transferred his interest in the operating rights to Equity Oil, and it
to Weber Oil, neither litigants here."
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N. J. Meagher, Jr. in the portion of his affidavit quoted
above unequivocally identifies the interest now held by
'Veber Oil Company as the Phebus one-half interest.
Paragraph number 13 of N. J. Meagher's (Sr.) affidavit in support of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment states:
"On January 19, 1945, Phebus executed the
aforesaid quitclaim transferring his interest in the
Sheridan Lease to Juhan.
Plaintiffs assert no title to said Phebus interest in the Sheridan Lease." (R. 167)
At the Provo hearing on the motion for summary
judgment the difference between counsel as to interpretation of the Dunford decree, as modified by this Court
on appeal, is strikingly pointed out:
"MR. GUSTIN: What right, after the Dunford decree and after it had been adjudicated by
the Supreme Court that the subject matter was
the Stock half, 'vhat is there out of that half that
could now be litigated unless you are impeaching
the Dunford decree~
MR. 'VHEAT: ''Tell, the ans,ver is simple,
the Supreme Court did 'not adjudicate the Stock
half was the subject n1atter of the litigation."
(Rep. Tr. 292) (En1phasis added)
To say that the Stock h.alf "\vas not the subject matter
of litigation in the last appeal is spurious. This Court
leaves no roo1n for equiYocation that l\Ieagher clanns
nothing through Phebus but elan11s a one-half interest
through Stork's "release," the ... principal subject of this
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suit." It necessarily follows that out of the subject I?atter
in litig.ation Stock was decreed one-sixteenth and Juhan
was decreed three-sixteenths of the oil- (¥2 of 40.75%).
This facet of the decree was affirmed by this Court and
,\ras never the subject of appeal.
The decree in favor of Stock and Juhan was a divisible independent portion thereof and if the plaintiffs had
questioned it they should have taken their cross appe.al.
Rosenthyne v. ·Matth•ews-McCulloch Co., 51 Utah 38, 168
P. 957, Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 P. 2d 387,
and Spendlove v. Shewchuck, 116 Utah 248, 209 P. 2d 247,
in which latter case it is stated that when the respondent
does not cross appeal and does not assign the ruling of
the lower court .as error, then "respondent has not raised
any issue before this court which the court can review.''
The motion of Weber Oil Company for summary
judgment (R. 188-189) 'vas for a decree of summary
judgment against the plaintiffs adjudicating Weber Oil
Company to be the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the lessee's rights under the Sheridan Lease,
and that the plaintiffs, and each of them, have no right,
title, interest or estate in or to the undivided one-half
interest in said Sheridan Lease so adjudicated as held,
ovvned and possessed by defendant Weber Oil Company.
The motion vvas based upon the decision of this Court
in its Case 7723 (255 P. 2d 989) and the remittitur issued
on January 20, 1954, to which judgment reference is made
by the ~feagher affidavit on motion for summary judgment (R. 179). The plaintiffs, as well as the defendant
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Weber Oil Company, were claiming that their respective
motions should be granted on the former Dunford judgment as affirmed on appeal.
All of the counts of the complaint are premised upon
the proposition that the plaintiffs have an undivided
one-half interest in the Sheridan Lease as against all
of the defendants, and the complaint refers to and attempts a construction of the decision of this Court to that
effect in the last appeal. The motions to dismiss made by
Weber Oil Company (R. 72-77) effectively raised the
issue as to whether the action could be so litigated as
against Weber Oil Company, but most certainly, as the
matter was submitted on the motions for summary judgment, the title question had resolved itself to the point
where, as a matter of law, the court was required to say
that \\Teber Oil Company is the owner of an undivided
one-half interest in the lessee's rights under the Sheridan
Lease and that the plaintiffs have no right, title, interest
or estate therein.
The Interlocutory Judgment and Decree appealed
from delineates, in f.avor of the plaintiffs, a 25% title out
of the Phebus side of the Sheridan Lease and takes from
Weber the adjudicated Stock and Juhan portion, and
thus would amend, Yary, contradict, reverse and annul the
Dunford decree ns affirn1ed by this Court on appe.al in
that regard. In the instant case the trial court could not
nor can it b(\ presun1ed to haYe departed fron1 the affirmed Dunford decree as to Stock and Juhan.
point to
the expression of this Court in DTtah Copper Co. v. Dis-

' Te
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trict Court, 91 Utah 377, 64 P. 2d 241:

"The rule is well established and there does
not seem to be anything to the contrary that when
a case has been determined by a reviewing court
and remanded to the trial court, the duty of the
latter is to comply with the mandate of the former.
The mandate is binding on the lower court and
must be strictly followed and carried into effect
.according to its true intent and meaning as determined by the directions given by the reviewing
court. When the trial court fails or refuses to obey
or give effect to the mandate or remittitur, or
misconstrues it or acts beyond its province in carrying it out, it becomes the province and duty of
the appellate court to enforce compliance there'vith, and it is generally recognized that such
may be done on writ or order of mandamus. The
lower court upon remand of a c.ase from a higher
court, must obey the mandate or remittitur and
render judgment in conformity thereto and has no
authority to enter any judgment not in conformity
with the order. Whatever comes before and is decided and disposed of by the reviewing court is
considered as finally settled and the inferior
court to which a mandate issues is bound by the
decree .as the law of the case and must carry it into
execution according to the mandate, and after the
reviewing court has determined the case before
it and remanded it to the lower court, the latter
is without power to modify, alter, amend, set
aside, or in any manner disturb or depart from
the judgment of the reviewing court; that the
judgment of the higher court is not reviewable
in ,any way by the court below and the lower court
cannot vary or examine the decree of the higher
court for .any other purpose than execution, or
give any other or further relief or review it even
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for apparent error upon any matter decided on
appeal, or meddle with it further than to settle
so much as has been remanded." (Emphasis
added.)
The plaintiffs, if they have any title in the Sheridan
Lease, have 25% of the lessee's rights with respect to
oil, less the proportionate share of operating expenditures. Stock and Juhan have 25% and Weber Oil Company has 50%. The plaintiffs have no interest in the
April 9, 1951 .agreement (Appendix L, Plaintiffs' Brief).
POINT 2.
THE INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF
DECEMBER 13, 1955, IS VOID AS TO WEBER OIL COMPANY.

By its rulings on motions on October 1-±, 1955 (R..
213-215) the court exercised all of the authority afforded
it under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter the onlv issues left to be tried were those specifically reserved as against Equity Oil Company. The rulings on n1otions dated, signed by the court and filed in
the action effectively dispose of all the ren1aining eounts
against the defendant ,,. . eber Oil Con1pany, and specifieally grants eber Oil Co1npany's n1otion for sun1n1ary
judg1nent thereon. There "Tere no reserYed issues against
any defendant Pxrept Equity Oil Co1npany and then only
in its status as a stakeholder.
o/

''T

Proceedings under Rule 56 are su1nn1ary in their
very nature .and require the judgment to be entered
"forthwith''. No findings are required and the judgment
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so entered is final, except as provided in subdivision (d)
of the rule. In the instant matter the only party remaining in the action is Equity Oil Company. The Fourth
Count of Plaintiffs' complaint had been dismissed by the
formal order of the court dated December 21, 1954 (R.
113-114).
There was no appeal from the rulings of October 14,
1955, .and it was not until after the time for appeal had
expired that the court entered the so-called Interlocutory
Judgment and Decree as drafted by plaintiffs. The
ruling of October 14, 1955, is not an order for a judgment
or a memorandum from vvhich the judgn1ent was to be
dra\vn. It is not a minute entry. It is a final judgment.
The rulings embody the self executing order granted on
defendants' motions for sununary judgment. The time
for an .appeal could not be extended by the Interlocutory
Judgment and Decree of December 13th nor could the
court make such further order without first having set
aside its order of October 14th.
In Mower v. "Af cCarthy, ______ Utah ______ , 245 P. 2d 224,
the dissenting opinion suggests, under Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution of Utah, that this Court is powerless
to review an appeal in cases of law without findings of
fact. This Court held, notwithstanding the constitutional
• that in reviewing a c.ase involving certain
provision,
rules of civil procedure where issues of fact are involved
and there are no findings of fact it is assumed that the
trier of the facts found them in accord with its decision.
The reason given by the lower court in the instant case
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is that the prior action, Case 2238, determined the title
issues and stated in effect that the Dunford decision, as
affirmed, was res judicata as to all of the parties. The
defendants could not re-litigate the Stock side of the title
and the plaintiffs could notre-litigate so as to reach over
into the Phebus side of the title.
Plaintiffs contend that the Interlocutory Judgment
and Decree of December 13, 1955, is interlocutory as to
Weber Oil Company and the individual defendants, as
well as to Equity Oil Company. The alleged decree as to
Weber is void but, nevertheless, Weber Oil Company can
invoke this Court's judgment on the voidness of the alleged decree by appeal to this Court, \vhich it is doing.
See Openshaw v. Young, 107 Utah 399, 152 P. 2d 84.
Admittedly the rulings of October 14, 1955, are interlocutory as to Equity Oil Company in its status of stakeholder and as to it there is no appeal until a final judgment. It must be assumed, however, that the trial court
correctly interpreted the decision of this Court in the
former case and that when it directed an accounting
against Equity Oil Con1pany of one-half of the proceeds
after operating expenses are deducted it was referring
to· one-half of the 40.75~c of the gross crude oil runs in
Equity's hands as stakeholder. All of which is consistent
\vith the Dunford decree as an1ended on appeal \o this
Court.
POINT 3.
THIS COURT CAN ONLY ACT HEREIN AS AN APPELLATE COURT AND NOT AS A COURT HAVING ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION.
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Point 2 of plaintiffs' brief would have this Court rewrite the Interlocutory .Judgment and Decree so that
Weber Oil Company, Stock and Juhan are obligated to
account and pay or, in the alternative, that this Court
umake clear that the lower court is not precluded from
making such provision when rendering its further orders
and decrees in this matter." We submit that such is not
the function of the appellate court.
The third point argued by plaintiffs boils down to
a "request" that this Court make "a clear declaration"
that Equity Oil Company is not a stakeholder but is a
principal, if not the principal defendant in the action.
The order of September 23, 1954 (R. 12·3-125) states:
"4. That the defendant Equity Oil Company,
pursuant to the stipulation of the parties made
in open court, continue to hold in a special fund
an amount equal to 40.75 per cent of the gross
crude oil runs from the property described in
plaintiffs' complaint after deducting operating
expenses, until the further order of the Court."
(Emphasis added.)
It 'vas upon that theory that the motions for summary
judgment were argued to the trial court. Consistent there·with the court, in its rulings on motions on October 14,
1955 (R. 213-215), stated :

"The Equity Oil Company appears only as a
stakeholder. It has, pursuant to agreement with
the Plaintiffs, maintained a special account of an
amount equal to at least 40.75 per cent of the gross
crude oil runs after expenses of operations." (Emphasis added.)
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Plaintiffs do not point to anything in the record that
would relieve them from the solemn pronouncement of
the stakeholder status of Equity Oil Company. There
is nothing that will support their change of theory and
there is nothing before this Court that will permit its
intervention, sitting as an appellate court, in the absence
of some appealable record, and as to that there is none.
Furthermore, it was determined by this Court in the last
appeal (255 P. 2d 989) that Equity Oil Company transferred the operating rights to Weber Oil Comp.any, and
this after a revie'v of the same documents that counsel
now point to to justify their change of theory. This
Court, in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, will follow
the record before it and is limited in its jurisdiction by
constitutional edict.
POINT 4.
THE INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND DECREE
WAS AN IMPOSITION UPON THE TRIAL COURT.

(a) The Interlocutory Judgment and Decree is not
only superfluous and a redundancy in the record after
the entered and final, as to \\~ eber, order of October 14,
1955, but it presun1es on its face to be a detern1ination
of disputed matters of fact. Counsel found it expedient
to make a recital of instru1nents that 'Yere passed upon
in the previous ease and 1nerged in the Dunford decree to
create the iu1pression of findings of fact as if the case
had been litigated for the first tune in the instant action.
The only question the eourt had before it on the n1otions
for sun11nar)r judgment 'vas "~hether, as a 1natter of law,
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it could say that title issues had been determined. There
are significant departures from the summary judgment
of October 14th, and then to cap the climax counsel complain of their own handiwork. They say that Weber Oil,
Juhan and Stock should be held to account in the same
manner as Equity. They would expand the judgment and
distort the rulings of the court even further than they
have already done by the form of judgment and decree
that they prevailed upon the court to sign.
(b) The instrument says nothing about the granting of Weber Oil Company's motion for summary judgment and which had the effect of dismissing it out of the
case. Quite to the contrary the form of the instrument
would retain jurisdiction of the whole action "for such
further proceedings as shall be deemed necessary upon
motion of any party or upon the Court's own motion,"
and subtly refers to "costs and interest." As prepared
by counsel the instrument is cleverly deceptive.
(c) The reeitals depart from the findings of this
Court as found at 255 P. 2d 989 at page 991 where this
Court stated:
"Defendant Juhan has transferred his interest
in the operating rights to Equity Oil, and it to
Weber Oil, neither litigants here."
Compare this finding, which is the heart of the matter,
with the language in the December 13th instrument:
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ed portions of whatever interest he may have had
in the Sheridan Lease to defendant Paul Stock
and to defendant Equity Oil Company, both of
whom had actual and constructive notice of the
prior transfer from defendant Paul Stock to plaintiff N.J. Meagher." (R. 219, lines 15-22).
There was only one time to correct the finding of
this Court that Juhan "has transferred his interest in
the operating rights to Equity Oil" and that was on the
petition for rehearing in the former appeal. If the fact
was as plaintiffs no-\v claim it to be, they should have
joined in the petition for rehearing that the defendants
filed in said action and which this Court had under advisement for many months. By failing to point out the
error, if in fact there was an error, they lulled this Court
into complacency and awaited their time to impose upon
the trial court in the instant case the factual premise as
if it had never before been determined.
The trial court ''Tas "po,verless to vary or examine"
the judgment of this Court for any other purpose than
execution "or giYe any other or further relief or review
it even for apparent error upon any matter decided on
appeal." Utah Copper Co. ~r. District Court, supra. In
this State, at h•ast, counsel cannot deliberately lead the
court into error. Pettiupill r. Perkins, 2 lTtah 2d 266,
272 P. 2d 185.
(d) The sun1n1a ry judg1nent of October 14th requires Equity Oil C'1on1pany to account to all of the partie~--uo/ just to the illragher ch£ld1·en as provided in
the DeceinlH'r 1:3th instrument. ''rhy this departure'
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N. J. Meagher and Katherine T. Meagher, his wife,
on ~larch 15, 1954, demanded that the defendants pay to
them, as \vell as their children, their alleged share of the
proceeds fron1 the oil produced and sold (R. 32-34). Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in paragr.aph numbered 3 (R. 163) says: "That plaintiffs by virtue of their
ownership of said interest in the Sheridan Lease are entitled to an accounting from defendants of their operations thereunder." N. J. Meagher, in his deposition on
April 16, 1955, and read into the record (Rep. Tr. 52),
testified:

"Q. And you claim the personal right, the individual right, of an accounting in this action~

A. I think so."
Exhibit 7 in the instant record is a quitclaim deed
dated 1\fay 10, 1954, the day before the present action
was filed, \Vhereby N. J. Th1eagher and Katherine T.
Meagher, his 'vife, quitclaimed the property specific.ally
described in the complaint herein to their children, the
other plaintiffs. The former quitclaim deed from N. J.
1feagher and Katherine T. Meagher to their children
dated January 27, 1948, Exhibit A-22 in the prior action,
was before the discovery of oil. It is settled law in this
State that .a quitclaim deed does not pass an after acquired title. Duncan v. Hemmelwright 7 112 Utah 262,
186 P. 2d 965, Dowse v. K ammerman 7 ______ Utah ______ , 246
P. 2d 881. There is respectable authority for the proposition that under an oil and gas lease the right of the
lessees is merely an option to explore the premises, and
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no estate, title or interest is vested in the1n prior to the
discovery of oil through drilling operations :
"When such oil was discovered on the leased
premises through the drilling operations, a new
property was brought into being, consisting of
the oil in place beneath the surface of the premises.
It was then that there was discovered the property
interest."
Petroleum Exploration et al. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 4th Cir., 1951
Ill.) 193 F. 2d 59.
To thus prevail upon the trial judge for a judgment
by-passing the Senior nieaghers either frqm a tax angle
or to leave undetermined some facet of the litigation
that could possibly give rise to future harassment, is
equally reprehensible.
(e) Plaintiffs say in their brief at page 11 that
\Veber Oil Company has never asserted that it acquired
any interest "in the Stock half" of the lease as a bona
fide purchaser for value. This begs the question because
it has heretofore been adjudicated and it is admitted
in these proceedings that ,,. .eber has the Phebus half of
the Sheridan Lease. Plaintiffs atte1npt to delineate
through the recitals of the Dece1nber 13th instrun1ent ~
title in \A.T eber fron1 the Stock half~ not"'"ithstanding the
previous adjudication and the adrnissions in the instant
record. Thn t is one of the subtleties of the Dece1nber 13th
instrunH)nt as prt•pnred hy plaintiffs' counsel. If any
finding of fact \Yas appropriate, then there should be
inserted the adn1itted fact that it " . .as after the remittitur
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in the first appeal that Equity Oil Company, openly
and notoriously, entered upon the property, drilled for
and discovered oil; that from the time of the quitclaim
deed and assignment from Equity Oil Company to Weber
dated December 30, 1947, and until August 3, 1949, when
1\ir. 11eagher filed his amended reply in the former action, six oil 1vells were completed on the property as producers (R. 207-212), all drilled pursuant to a claim of
right \vithout protest by them.
POINT 5.
THE FOURTH COUNT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AS
AGAINST ANY OF THE DEFENDANTS.

This count vvas dismissed out of the action by the
formal order of the court on December 21, 1954 (R. 113114). It is a novel theory to say that one beco~es liable
through the forbearance of money for income tax consequences. Counsel do not point to any authority supporting the claim and we believe none can be found. There
is no causal connection between .anything that the defendants are alleged to have done or are alleged to have
omitted doing and the obligation to pay income tax.
CONCLUSION
We not only challenge the integrity of plaintiffs' brief
in light of the record, but also their good faith in their
submission to the trial court of the Interlocutory J udgment and Decree dated December 13, 1955, differing so
obviously from the rulings of October 14, 1955. The brief
does not contain a forthright statement of the record
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in the instant case, from which record it is obvious that
the Interlocutory Judgment and Decree of December 13th
is a nullity and a document from which the plaintiffs
cannot appeal. The court below disposed of the action,
so far as Weber Oil Company is concerned, by its summary judgment entered on October 14, 1955, from which
there was no timely appeal. The judgment adjudicating
one-half of the leasehold interest to Weber Oil Company
is final.
The appeals from the so-called Interlocutory Judgment and Decree should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN, RICHARDS,
~IATTSSON & EVANS
Attorneys for Appellant and
Respondent Weber Oil Company
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